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From the Chinese Room Argument
to the Church-Turing Thesis
Dean Petters 1 and Achim Jung 2
Abstract. Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment incorporates
a number of assumptions about the role and nature of programs
within the computational theory of mind. Two assumptions are anal-
ysed in this paper. One is concerned with how interactive we should
expect programs to be for a complex cognitive system to be inter-
preted as having understanding about its environment and its own
inner processes. The second is about how self-reflective programs
might analyse their own processes. In particular, how self-reflection,
and a high level of interactivity with the environment and other in-
telligent agents in the environment, may give rise to understanding
in artificial cognitive systems. A further contribution that this pa-
per makes is to demonstrate that the Church-Turing Thesis does not
apply to interactive systems, and to self-reflective systems that in-
corporate interactivity. This is an important finding because it means
that claims about interactive and self-reflective systems need to be
considered on a case by case basis rather than using lessons from rel-
atively simple non-interactive and non-reflective computational mod-
els to generalise to all computational processes.
1 Introduction
This paper will show that Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA)
scenario [14] can be extended and given more detail so that new vari-
ations of this scenario have a fundamentally different relationship
with the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT). Searle’s CRA is a gedanken
experiment aimed at demonstrating that computer programs cannot
really understand the meaning of what they process, even if their ob-
servable behaviour seems to demonstrate understanding. The CTT is
commonly interpreted as stating that the intuitive concept of com-
putability is fully captured by Turing machines or any equivalent
formalism (such as recursive functions, the lamba calculus, Post pro-
duction rules, and many others). The CTT implies that if a function
is (intuitively) computable, then it can be computed by a Turing ma-
chine. Conversely, if a Turing machine cannot compute a function, it
is not computable by any mechanism whatsoever.
This paper presents a family of variations to the CRA which in-
volve changing the CRA to require significantly more interaction
with the outside world: in frequency of interruptions; interleaving
of interruptions; and in the nature of the information provided by in-
terruptions. A second family of variations to the CRA includes the
same pattern of interruptions and close coupled interaction with the
external environment but also includes ways in which higher-level
routines within the CRA program can analyse the basic program for
‘meaningful’ patterns in its own internal processing. These versions
of the CRA are outside the scope of the CTT because the CTT is
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concerned with situations where programs act as mathematical func-
tions with inputs fully provided at the start of the computation and
with no possibility of new inputs being included during the run of
the program. This matters because the CTT is commonly invoked
to generalise the lessons from the CRA to all forms of computation
whatsoever while it is only legitimate to draw conclusions about pro-
grams and computational mechanisms which follow the basic input-
output paradigm. If programs presented in new variants of the CRA
scenario fall outside the scope of the CTT (but are still recognisable
and implementable programs in the sense of being precisely specifi-
able algorithms) then the lessons from these variants will not neces-
sarily generalise to all possible programs. Therefore, any generalisa-
tions would need to be validated on a case-by-case basis for prospec-
tive program formalisms. The paper concludes with the observation
that the new variant CRA scenarios sketched in this paper are not
only more similar to typical human cognition than the very simpli-
fied portrayal of processing in the original CRA, but the complexity
they present is fast being achieved and overtaken by contemporary
computing systems.
2 Overview of the CRA — and how lessons drawn
from it are generalised
Published in 1980 in the paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs’’, [14],
Searle made an argument based on a ‘Chinese Room’. It is a thought
experiment that is intended to show that running programs cannot
have understanding and awareness of what they are doing. Searle in-
troduced his first CRA scenario by discussing an earlier simulation
produced by Roger Schank and co-workers, [13]. Searle explained
that he was using that work as inspiration for this CRA scenario be-
cause of his own familiarity with this program. However, he also
claimed that his argument does not rely on the details of Schank’s
programs, and in fact applies to any Turing machine simulation that
is modelling mental processes. It is this claim of generalisation to
all programs (because Schank’s program can be run on a Turing ma-
chine) that is the critical focus of the present paper.
Schank’s program simulates the ability to understand stories. The
program accesses information about particular contexts and the pro-
gram can then answer questions about a story set in that context. This
is accomplished by analysing what is stated in the story and what
can be expected in the context in which this particular story is set.
Schank’s program accomplishes this by possessing a representation,
which he terms a ‘script’ that includes contextual information of the
sort that humans possess. Searle highlights the fact that in this pro-
cess it is only the form of the representations of the story and script
that are necessary and sufficient to produce the output. The content
of the representations of the story and script takes no part in the algo-
rithmic process and is not required to transform input to output. The
key lesson that Searle draws from the CRA is that the formal symbol
manipulations carried out within the Chinese room do not give rise
to meaning or understanding, operations in the Chinese room are all
“syntax but not semantics” ([14], p. 422).
3 Different varieties of Searle’s Chinese Room
scenario have fundamentally different
relationships with the CTT
3.1 Searle’s original scenario
‘Suppose that I’m locked in a room and given a large batch
of Chinese writing. Suppose furthermore (as is indeed the case)
that I know no Chinese, either written or spoken, and that I’m
not even confident that I could recognize Chinese writing as
Chinese writing distinct from, say, Japanese writing or mean-
ingless squiggles. To me, Chinese writing is just so many mean-
ingless squiggles.
Now suppose further that after this first batch of Chinese
writing I am given a second batch of Chinese script together
with a set of rules for correlating the second batch with the first
batch. The rules are in English, and I understand these rules
as well as any other native speaker of English. They enable
me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of
formal symbols, and all that ‘formal’ means here is that I can
identify the symbols entirely by their shapes. Now suppose also
that I am given a third batch of Chinese symbols together with
some instructions, again in English, that enable me to corre-
late elements of this third batch with the first two batches, and
these rules instruct me how to give back certain Chinese sym-
bols with certain sorts of shapes in response to certain sorts of
shapes given me in the third batch. Unknown to me, the people
who are giving me all of these symbols call the first batch “a
script,” they call the second batch a “story”. and they call the
third batch “questions”. Furthermore, they call the symbols I
give them back in response to the third batch “answers to the
questions” and the set of rules in English that they gave me,
they call “the program.” ’ ([14], p. 418)
Searle’s lesson is that an observer external to the room would see
meaningful behaviour but within the room there is only meaningless
symbol processing — so demonstrating that understanding cannot
arise from just the operation of formal syntactic processes.
We can see that this very abstract description of a running program
is not only based on a single run of the Schank program, but also
matches the classic modus operandi of the very early generations of
electronic computers. These carried out ‘batch jobs’ where the input
and program were both completely specified at the start. The com-
puting machine would process the input according to the program,
and the output would appear as a paper printout. Contemporary com-
puting no longer works like this, with many possible interruptions to
ongoing processing. The next scenario attempts to sketch out differ-
ent ways in which interruptions and new input data can appear during
the running of a program.
3.2 Searle managing multiple tasks by effectively
processing real-time updates from the
environment
This quote from Monsell highlights the delicate balancing act in nat-
ural systems between forcing through ongoing processing on a pri-
mary task and dealing appropriately with potential interruptions:
“Hence the cognitive task we perform at each moment, and
the efficacy with which we perform it, results from a complex
interplay of deliberate intentions that are governed by goals
(‘endogenous’ control) and the availability, frequency and re-
cency of the alternative tasks afforded by the stimulus and its
context (‘exogenous’ influences). Effective cognition requires a
delicate, ‘just-enough’ calibration of endogenous control that
is sufficient to protect an ongoing task from disruption (e.g. not
looking up at every movement in the visual field), but does not
compromise the flexibility that allows the rapid execution of
other tasks when appropriate (e.g. when the moving object is
a sabre-toothed tiger).” ([10], p. 134).
Following Monsell, an interactive CRA scenario could capture the
closely coupled nature of interactions between agent and environ-
ment and might involve running many sub-programs in parallel with
an overarching program acting as a kind of operating system. Not
only does Searle’s 1980 scenario completely ignore the nature of
algorithms that require this level of constant checking the current
state of the environment, it also ignores the nature of ‘forever’ pro-
cesses such as operating systems carrying out processes such as re-
source management and process control, but then returning to the
same ground state and never providing a final output. Yet it seems
something like this kind of ‘operating system’ algorithm must be
implemented in humans and other animals. In addition, the ever in-
creasing complexity of artificial control systems like intelligent mo-
bile robots and self-driving cars can increasingly be seen to incorpo-
rate these kinds of complex interactions, driven by environment in-
terruptions alongside the requirements of multiple primary tasks. So
adding further complexity, interactive variants of the CRA scenario
might also include parallel computation, probabilistic computation,
and real-time computation, all of which are manifestly outside the
scope of the CTT.
This leads to a key claim of this paper — an interactive variant
of the Chinese Room Argument scenario similar to Monsell’s de-
scription, getting input during the running of the program, but also
including multi-processing, real-time computing, (truly) probabilis-
tic computation, programs that never terminate, distributed computa-
tion, intentional computation, and higher order computation, is out-
side the scope of the CTT. This is because the CTT is concerned only
with the equivalence of systems that operate from input provided as a
string to output as a string; it does not cover programs that deal with a
series of inputs, appearing over time and at unexpected moments, or
that are capable of making changes to the operation of the program
while it is running. As laid out clearly and carefully in his 1936 pa-
per, Turing’s concern was with the steps a mathematician (a human
“computer” in Turing’s terminology) goes through when following a
precisely and finitely specified procedure. His analysis is compelling
and we see no reason not to accept the CTT, though we emphasise
its constrained setting. The (partial) functions from strings to strings
that can be computed by Turing’s “machines” are the same ones that
can be computed by any and all formalisms that have to date been put
forward as alternatives. Put another way, the evidence for the CTT is
very strong indeed, but this does not give licence to applying it — by
analogy, as it were — to other forms of computation. These “other
forms of computation” are not the fruits of idle speculation but very
much day-to-day reality for software engineers and computer users
alike: computing machines no longer expect a question on a tape (or
punch cards), go away and compute, and return an answer as a sin-
gle file (or more punch cards or some output paper). Contemporary
programs interact with their environment in multiple ways, and em-
ploy facilities (such as hardware-based random number generators)
that can not be shoehorned into the paradigm for which the CTT was
formulated.
4 The CTT in theoretical computer science and its
implications for the philosophy of mind
4.1 Functions versus processes
The misconception that the CTT applies to all forms of computation
is very wide-spread also within the computer science community, and
even among theoretical computer scientists. Goldin and Wegner, [6],
examine the likely origins of this belief, which they term the ‘Strong
Church-Turing Thesis’, and explore the reasons why it holds such
sway. They suggest that the way the first generation of computing
machines were designed and used (i.e., the “batch processing” dis-
cussed above) was so strongly correlated with Turing’s mathematical
concept of a (human) “computer” (i.e., his “Turing machines”) that
standard undergraduate textbooks adopted Turing machines as a suit-
able formal abstraction of computing practice. Like us, Goldin and
Wegner point out the role of interactivity that is so central to modern
computing systems, and that is simply not covered by the CTT.
Some researchers have been very aware that Turing machines are
not appropriate for modelling interactive behaviour and have pro-
posed alternative mathematical abstractions. We mention especially
the work of Milner, [9], and Hoare, [8], on computational “pro-
cesses”. It is astonishing (but not the focus of the present paper) that
although their work has been incorporated into undergraduate syl-
labuses for decades, courses on computability theory still promulgate
the view that Turing machines are all there is to computation.
Beyond the analysis for this state of affairs given in [6] we be-
lieve that it is useful for our argument to point out one crucial dif-
ference between the setting of the CTT and the more encompassing
computational models of Milner and Hoare: When we consider com-
putation from fixed input to single output (the “function view” of
computation), then the equivalence of computational mechanisms is
almost unavoidable. To give just one example, it is not the case that
the λ-calculus was designed with computability in mind; rather, its
purpose originally was to give a new foundation for mathematics,
replacing set theory (see [2] for a historical introduction). As far as
functions from natural numbers to natural numbers are concerned,
the equivalence with Turing machine computability was noted af-
terwards. In contrast, mathematical models for interactive behaviour
(the “process view” of computation) can be quite different in expres-
sivity. A canonical, maximally expressive formalism for processes
simply does not exist. We point the interested reader to Abramsky’s
[1] where this fact is highlighted and explored.
One final comment on the difference between the functional and
the process point of view: It is, of course, possible to use a rich in-
teractive machine to implement a simple function; after all, that is
what we do with our modern computers all the time. It is our belief
that this does not lead to new computable functions, i.e., some sort of
“hypercomputation”. In other words, the CTT is valid even if more
sophisticated machinery is employed. It is the other direction that is
the core of this paper: When considering more sophisticated com-
putational tasks, then standard Turing machines (and their mode of
operation) are not sufficient to explore the range of possibilities.
4.2 Computation in an extended sense
So far, we have focused on interactivity as a (ubiquitous) feature
of modern computational systems which is not present in the Tur-
ing machine model. There are others which are also interesting for
our argument, especially in an interactive setting. We begin with the
question whether the computational process has internal memory or
not. If it does, then it can react differently to identical stimuli from
the environment as time passes, and indeed it can exhibit “learning
behaviour”. A study of this facility from the point of view of com-
putability theory is presented in [5], for example. What is important
for our argument is the fact that an interactive process that has some
finite internal memory is strictly more powerful than a process that
does not, and a process that has unlimited internal memory is strictly
more powerful than one with finite memory. Thus we have a fairly
straightforward computational situation were the CTT is false, or to
be more precise, where there is no analogue of the CTT.
If we translate these findings to Searle’s Chinese Room, then we
are in a situation where he may be in interaction with his environ-
ment, constantly receiving and issuing statements expressed in Chi-
nese characters. Having the ability to make personal notes (in English
but perhaps with Chinese characters interspersed) would greatly en-
rich his experience and might even lead him to understand the mean-
ing of these interactions. This would be true even if the form of his
note-taking were already prescribed in his original “script”.
A similar argument can be made for processes that have access to
a real-time clock, or to a source of true random numbers.
4.3 Implications for the philosophy of mind
Both Goldin and Wegner, and Abramsky, highlight an issue in the-
oretical science which has not yet been received in the philosophy
of mind literature. They show that for computer scientists the CTT
should be treated as a thesis that certain models of computation are
equivalent for tasks that require the transformation of given fixed fi-
nite input to some output, and not that TMs can implement every pos-
sible kind of information processing machine. Goldin and Wegner do
argue that researchers in Artificial Intelligence are somewhat ahead
of researchers in theoretical computer science in promoting interac-
tion rather than computation of functions as beneficial in expressing
the behaviour of information processing systems. For example, they
cite Rodney Brooks’ 1991 statement of interaction as a prerequisite
for intelligent system behaviour [3], and Russel and Norvig recognis-
ing that intelligent behaviour is better modelled by interactive agents
than functions with prestated inputs and outputs that only occur at the
termination of the computation [12]. However, this mistaken view,
that the CTT states that TMs are capable of such broad information
processing capabilities, seems to be what justifies the generalisation
that lessons from Searle’s specific CRA scenario applies to all pos-
sible programs. For example, in The Critique of Cognitive Reason’
Searle invokes the CTT to state that for any algorithm there is a TM
which can implement that algorithm — which is a correct interpre-
tation of the CTT (assuming the common interpretation of “algo-
rithm”). However, he then goes on to suggest that the next step from
this line of reasoning is that the brain is a Universal TM. Whilst he
concedes that in addition to algorithmic processes (within the scope
of the CTT) there may be unconscious processes outside the scope of
the CTT, he does not consider that processes which link up and tran-
sition between individual computations are of this unconscious type.
In fact, he does not consider dynamic and contingent transitions be-
tween individual function-based computations at all ([15], p. 837).
4.4 Searle carrying out self-reflection of his own
program
New interactive variants of the CRA may be outside the CTT, but
they do not necessarily demonstrate more understanding in the inner
workings of the Chinese room. Inserted information may be just as
impossible for ‘Searle in the room’ to understand as the Chinese sym-
bols in the original CRA scenario. However, we can not only vary fre-
quency, interleaving, and parallelisation due to interruptions, but also
form new CRA scenarios which involve kinds of information that are
intended to interact with the running program to change the English
rules that Searle carries out. The CTT does not cover processes where
in principle any information (from a simple boolean to an analysis of
the running of the existing program to a whole new program) can
be added as input during the running of the program. In the book
‘Kinds of Minds’, Dennett [4] portrayed a number of different ab-
stract agents (creatures) according to how they processed informa-
tion. He presented Darwinian creatures as not capable of learning but
acting upon evolved reflexes; Skinnerian creatures as learning from
association; and Popperian creatures that can pre-select strategies af-
ter evaluating their likely success in internal working models. In ad-
dition to these creatures, Dennett also described Gregorian creatures,
“whose inner environments are informed by the designed portions of
the outer environment.“ ([4], p. 99). Thus Gregorian creatures can
import ‘mind tools’ wholesale from the environment ([4], p. 100).
What is relevant to the CRA and Searle’s conclusion is whether the
inputs to the Chinese room can not only add to the store of Chinese
symbols but also add to or substitute for the English instructions that
‘Searle in the room’ actually follows. Programs which can be inter-
rupted to receive new information that may alter in a fundamental
way their processing, even conceivably by changing the running pro-
gram itself, are clearly outside the scope of the CTT. This is because
if a new program can be given as input on an interruption, this is no
longer the program which started processing.
It is possible to have algorithms in the Chinese Room that en-
gage in self-reflection and self-analysis. When self-reflection and
self-analysis occur it can create a kind of internal ‘meaning’ about
the system which may then be linked to external meaning in the form
of patterns in Chinese symbols. Any ‘Searle in the room’ can only
carry out the English instructions which are directly given to him.
‘Searle in the room’ can never do anything which is not part of a task
set out in English instructions. But a ‘Searle in the room’ can follow
the programmed instructions for the specific ‘narrow’ task at hand of
processing stories, and his overall task can also involve a whole set
of further instructions which may be triggered at any time, and of-
ten are triggered by well considered interruptions from the outside,
and which involve questioning what the nature of the connections be-
tween internal rules and data mean. He can be asking, in addition to
what patterns in input and output data exist, what patterns exist in the
use of his English rules. When do rules co-occur? What rules predict
other rules? Do some rules being triggered predict the task is nearly
over? Are some patterns more surprising than others? Are there clus-
ters or categories of rules that perform similar tasks? The ‘Searle in
the room’ accomplishing this broader and self-reflective task is not
carrying out a non-algorithmic process. Rather, he is still following
English rules that compare rules and processes looking for identifi-
able patterns. But these patterns do not then trigger the outputting
of meaningless symbols. Rather, Searle is learning about meaning in
processing patterns apart and aside from the meaning of the symbol
tokens being processed. Meaning is emerging from the internal pro-
cessing of rules set apart from the meaning of the Chinese symbols.
These ‘Searle in the room’ self-reflection scenarios highlight dis-
tinctions between: (i) algorithms that carry out specific narrowly de-
fined tasks, and just carry out those tasks versus algorithms that carry
out tasks and simultaneously search for meaning in the properties
and implications in patterns in running processes and events; and
(ii) ‘representational’ meaning by understanding the content of sym-
bol tokens versus ‘dynamic processing’ meaning by understanding
the properties and implications in patterns in running processes and
events.
Further variants of self-reflection scenarios include: ‘Searle in the
room’ looking for meaning but making no connection to the exter-
nal meaning of the Chinese symbols, so all meaning emerges from
the bottom up; and, ‘Searle in the room’ looking for meaning in-
ternally and connecting this to appropriate external symbols — thus
giving external symbols more than derived intentionality. He might
be helped in this by people outside the room interacting with him in
a way designed to foster the emergence of meaning.
5 Importance of the CTT for psychology and
cognitive science
In his review of the literature around the CRA, Preston makes clear
why CTT matters to psychology and cognitive science:
“Even more important than the nature of the thesis, per-
haps, is the matter of its implications. It’s no exaggeration to
say that the Church-Turing thesis has constituted the funda-
mental inspiration behind AI, the reason for thinking that elec-
tronic digital computers must be capable of (at least) human-
level intelligence. Cognitive scientists have generally taken the
Church Turing thesis to mean that any function that can be
computed can be computed by a Turing machine. This would
mean that, as long as we ignore or abstract away from resource
limitations, anything the human brain can do (any function it
can compute) could also be done (computed) by an electronic
digital computer. Cognitive processes, no matter how intelli-
gent must be decomposed into routines whose primitive steps
can all be executed by a machine” ([11], p. 6).
Since it was first formulated in the 1940s no-one has really ques-
tioned the CTT, and nor do we. It is one of the jewels of theoreti-
cal computer science [7]. However, the CTT is concerned only with
functions from from strings to strings — input needs to be given as a
fixed finite string and output (if it is produced) will be a finite string.
The CTT underlies the strength of the CRA because it allows Searle
to say: ‘the limitations of the program in the CRA applies to all pro-
grams because of the CTT’. Accepting this generalisation strategy,
as Searle does, means there can be no syntactic formal processes in
a program, of even fiendish complexity or strangeness, that will ever
give rise when running to any kind of semantics. If, on the other hand,
Searle cannot invoke the CTT for the CRA then whatever lessons he
draws from the CRA only apply to the specific scenario he presents.
6 Conclusion
This paper takes the position that there are implementable programs
which are outside the scope of the CTT. The central argument of this
paper is that invoking a mathematical theorem to make inferences
about real-time physically instantiated systems should be done with
careful consideration of both the scope of the theorem and the prop-
erties and complexity of the physical system. Turing set out to solve
the “Entscheidungsproblem” (decision problem) and for this purpose
proposed a mathematical formalism that faithfully emulates the pro-
cess of a human being following finitely specified instructions. It was
soon found that other formalisms have the same expressive power in
this specific setting, i.e., mathematical problem solving, and this then
led to the CTT. Situations in contemporary computing are now so
rich, they can no longer be said to be covered by a paradigm where
the inputs are known in advance, the system is left alone to do its
computation and then provides the answer. Critically, for richer kinds
of computation, some of which have been described in this paper, the
empirical evidence suggests that there are many shades of expressiv-
ity, which is why no-one has ever postulated an analogue of the CTT
for them.
This paper therefore agrees with Searle insofar as when programs
confirm to the requirements for CTT equivalence, there can be no
meaning in the internal symbol processing. But for programs outside
the scope of CTT, meaning can appear in several ways, (i), by in-
teraction with the environment, and (ii), by self-reflection within the
program. This paper challenges the idea that syntax (in the case of a
running program) cannot give rise to semantics. Therefore this paper
takes a radical approach which attempts to overturn 80 years of mis-
guided extrapolation that the CTT applies to all programs that are of
interest to computer science, cognitive science, and philosophy.
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